Vol. 11-9 October Part 2

October 1997, Volume 11, Issue 9

Reflecting on NATCA's impressive evolution Timon Kalpaxis, New York TRACON

NATCA certainly has evolved since its early days. Few envisioned a union as strong and organized as NATCA is today. We must give credit to the air traffic controllers and union leaders who, at a time when unions were hardly in vogue, took personal risks to advance the cause of air traffic professionals. It is remarkable that NATCA has grown and prospered during a time when corporate downsizing and union bashing were the norm.

In the new order of high tech and the temporary worker, many were writing off organized labor as a thing of the past. Workers would become entrepreneurs, empowered through skill development and diversification to assure themselves a steady stream of wage increases and job enrichment.

To compete in the rapidly changing global economy, ridged hierarchical organizational structures gave way to smaller and more team-oriented work groups where management and labor worked together to get the job done. Management took on more of a facilitator's role, making sure the resources were available for the team to perform at its best. Ultimately, the manager's goal was to look after the organization's most valuable resource, its workers.

In this age of never-ending corporate downsizing and reshuffling, it is hard to see this new management/labor partnership at work. Many employees, even managers, have grown disillusioned in a world where the rule seems to be everyone for themselves.

In many respects, the Federal Aviation Administration is affected by and reflects the greater economy. The FAA is in a constant state of flux and suffers from a lack of consistent and effective leadership. NATCA has recognized and filled this leadership void, and through its own organizational structure, has provided a greater sense of stability.

To be fair, many of management's problems are inherent in the bureaucratic tangle of the FAA. Its system encourages managers to move along rapidly, almost guaranteeing they will never stay long enough to learn how to effectively oversee their areas, or develop a strong rapport with employees. Rather than inspiring leadership, this incessant rotation spawns apathy, and sometimes, ineptitude. On the other hand, the vast majority of NATCA facility representatives are full performance level certified and therefore, intimately familiar with their respective operations. Many NATCA fac reps are also "lifers," and have been at their facilities for a long time. This has become a tremendous source of stability.

NATCA's ability to recognize and fight for what is right will assure its continued success. Establishing and maintaining partnerships with others willing to share the responsibility for managing the air traffic system is something this union consistently pursues. NATCA sees that the needs of the system user and operator are inextricably linked and has promoted a large number of liaisons to jointly explore common issues and concerns.

NATCA has evolved into a powerful and sophisticated organization. It is politically astute beyond the facility level, and willing to go public with the issues that affect users inside (controllers) and outside of the FAA. Our union has achieved some very unlikely victories. We received pay upgrades, when the rest of the country was experiencing pay cuts. NATCA secured us staffing increases, when downsizing was the buzz word. These are remarkable achievements made by a relatively small union in an anti-union political climate.

NATCA developed the courage to lead, and to drag the unwilling along. During the recent United Parcel Service strike, the general sentiment in the United States was supportive of the strikers. Their cause is the cause of the vast majority of people today-job security, job satisfaction and economic well being. But it took years of enduring low paying jobs, ruthless downsizing and corporate raiding for people to finally come to this realization. During these same years, NATCA was at the vanguard, helping lead the way.

NATCA should be proud it successfully fought these fights while taking the morally correct position -long before it became popular to do so.

NATCA deems DSR operationally unacceptable:

Every air traffic controller in the United States is waiting for the day his or her facility receives the latest technology. Centers are close to that day. The problem is, the piece of equipment slated for installation won't help them perform their work better, but will actually increase the complexity of their job function and result in a greater risk of error and loss of productivity.

Facility representatives from air route traffic control centers across the country met in Washington, D.C., to discuss the fate of the new Display System Replacement equipment scheduled for installation in the near future. They unanimously agreed that, in its current state, DSR is operationally unacceptable and the Federal Aviation Administration must stop its implementation until all identified deficiencies are fixed. If this is not done, there will be tremendous safety and cost implications.

In a letter to the FAA's Neil Planzer, NATCA Executive Vice President Mike McNally declared, in accordance with a policy unanimously adopted by the union's National Executive Board on Aug. 13, NATCA demands the FAA immediately "cease and desist deployment and/or implementation of DSR for ARTCCs until: DSR is operationally suitable to the representatives of the air traffic controllers who use the system; it allows controllers to efficiently handle existing and projected increases in traffic volume with the same or higher level of effectiveness as the current system; there are no observable system degradation or safety compromise due to difficulties with data entry, displayed data, and/or other significant inefficiency; it does not degrade controller health and/or welfare due to improper human machine interface; and DSR complies with the Americans with Disabilities Act."

One of the main problems with DSR is the configuration of the keyboard. It is similar to the ones found on personal computers. Controllers would need to use two hands, rather than one to operate the equipment. "This is cumbersome and inhibits good controller technique," says NATCA Technology Coordinator Dick Swauger. "It destroys the excellence now present in the controller workforce. It took controllers years to become experts with the current system to the point where they make very few, if any, mistakes. Now they must learn a completely new system and the level of proficiency will undoubtedly decrease."

The new keyboard requires numerous entries to do what controllers currently do in just a few keystrokes without ever taking their eyes off their scopes. These extra steps cost precious time when the controller needs to make split second decisions.

The decrease in controller efficiency and productivity caused by DSR has several cost implications. If installed as is, millions of dollars in overtime must be spent on training to teach controllers how to use this new equipment. The fac reps at the meeting in Washington, D.C. estimated it would take them up to a year of training to be able to use DSR. Even then, they would not be as proficient as they are with the current system. If FAA had developed a tool similar to the ones currently used, controllers would most likely only need one to two days of training, saving millions of overtime dollars.

The nation's economy would also be severely impacted by the implementation of DSR. "If it takes a year for controllers to learn the system and they are still not as proficient as they were with the old system, air traffic will back-up," said Swauger. "To keep safety at the highest level, the whole system will slow down. Airplanes will use more fuel, airlines will raise ticket prices to compensate and consumers will suffer."

DSR, a leftover from the failed Advanced Automation System, does nothing to help controllers do their jobs. Swauger says FAA should have started from scratch and created a tool that helps controllers handle traffic rather than continuing to develop something NATCA representatives have been telling them was unsuitable for the past four years. In Swauger's opinion, the new equipment should be more similar to what controllers currently use, but with expanded capacity to handle the growing needs of the aviation system.

The FAA continues to tell centers the current state of DSR is the only option because it will be impossible to come up with funds to adapt it. NATCA is not asking the agency to approach Congress for additional funds, but to move money from the budget of projects such as Flight 2000-a pilot test for free flight-to the DSR program. According to Swauger, the free flight test could be conducted in a computer lab.

"NATCA will work with the agency and explain the cost implications of DSR," said McNally. "The FAA must compare the savings of the cost of building something controllers can work with against installation of a flawed system. The bottom line is DSR cannot go in as is. It must be fixed."

Boston Center controllers picket to protest FAA negligence

Controllers at Boston Center hit the pavement in protest of the Federal Aviation Administration's negligence in dealing with asbestos problems plaguing the facility. Approximately 50 NATCA members conducted informational picketing on Aug. 15 to alert the public and the media of the FAA's gross incompetence and total disregard of controllers' health in handling this issue.

Several local newspapers and television stations covered the story, generating positive feedback from the public. New England Region Vice President Mike Blake says controllers can't go anywhere without someone asking about the situation and sympathizing.

Picketing occurred after the FAA failed to evacuate the facility on July 29 because of dangerous asbestos levels six times above the national standard requiring evacuation of non-essential personnel and respirators for all others. Not only did management neglect to clear the building, but it did not notify employees until one week after the fact.

New FAA Administrator Jane Garvey visited the site Aug. 8, and assured controllers improvements would be made to the agency's asbestos abatement procedures. Management promised to clean and stabilize the area before the weekend began. The following Tuesday, NATCA's industrial hygiene consultant reinspected the site. No work had been done.

"The agency is now trying to tell us there was never any exposure," said Blake. "It claims the monitoring used to check the air quality-an approach the FAA originally agreed to-was not the right method of sampling. When this issue was brought to management's attention, it was not dealt with. Now it refuses to acknowledge there was ever a problem."

Intervention from the state's congressional delegation has not pushed the FAA to act. Sen. Judd Gregg, R-N.H., and Rep. Charles Bass, R-N.H., both interceded on controllers' behalf. Gregg sent Garvey a letter expressing his concern over the agency's handling of the issue. He encouraged her to pursue an aggressive effort to determine how the situation occurred and how to prevent similar things from happening in the future.

An agreement was reached to install a new heating/ventilation/air conditioning system; however, preliminary construction designs are still faulty. Management says the work will begin around Nov. 3, but it refuses to listen to NATCA's concerns about how barriers will be attached.

"The agency is now just beginning the pre-abatement phase of the construction," said Blake. "This should have been completed before any work took place. This project was flawed from the beginning."

Blake submitted a petition to expand the picketing to Logan Airport to bring the issue into more public view. Efforts to organize similar actions nationally are now underway.

"This is not an isolated incident," said Blake. "Several other centers around the country are dealing with the same thing. The FAA cannot be allowed to continue to put controllers' lives in jeopardy."

Asbestos abatement out of control at two FAA facilities

Michael A. Pinto, Ph.D., Wonder Makers, Inc.

It was the worst of projects at Boston and it was another bad project at Indianapolis. Unfortunately, these are just the latest examples in a long string of asbestos removal undertakings gone awry at centers and towers around the country.

Even more disheartening is the fact that in both instances, center personnel's exposure to airborne asbestos could have been prevented with proper oversight by Federal Aviation Administration and the application of lessons learned from similar mistakes at other facilities.

Controllers and other staff face serious health issues because the agency refuses to take precautions and follow procedures already set up to keep asbestos exposure in check. NATCA persistently pressures FAA management to take necessary steps and consider the health of air traffic controllers.

Amazing similarities exist between the Boston and Indianapolis asbestos abatement projects. The contractual provisions of Article 77 of the 1993 agreement between NATCA and the FAA dictated how the work should have proceeded. Locally negotiated contingency plans were in place, however, investigations after controller exposure revealed no one with direct management responsibilities for the projects was aware of either of these documents. This was especially galling at Boston Center, where 13 months before the project began, NATCA settled a grievance for a previous incident requiring FAA to educate its project managers about the specifics of the contingency plan before future work with the carcinogen.

The reputations of the abatement contractors were less than dazzling. Despite the requirement of using low bidders, the FAA should have done a better job checking credentials and past work practices. A quick check of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration web site provides the citation history of inspected firms. The agency would have discovered the contractor at Boston Center had 21 citations over the past few years, with the most recent violation categorized as "serious." This breach was for failure to seal the containment, the same problem as Boston Center.

A final similarity between the two projects is the agency's unwillingness to admit a mistake was made and take corrective action. In Indianapolis, an engineer overruled the FAA's own hired hygienist and decided it was not necessary to seal and clean a room after a major asbestos exposure. When questioned about the incident later, numerous project managers denied that cleaning recommendations had been made.

At Boston Center, the FAA moved from reluctance to denial when its response to a national grievance noted, "No definitive sampling exists to support a claim that the OSHA permissible exposure limit was ever exceeded. . ."-despite area samples in the control room at levels three times OSHA's allowable limit. Apparently, the fact that the agency's industrial hygiene firm developed the sampling scheme, collected the samples, and then analyzed them, does not obligate the FAA to ensure "definitive sampling" is actually conducted.

Have things improved since these two major mistakes? Yes and no. The agency issued a stop work order for all asbestos projects until the problems were sorted out, and it put together teams to investigate the situation at both centers. Unfortunately, the FAA has made no move to retract its denial of the Boston exposure and move forward with medical exams.

All controllers are urged to learn from these situations and contact regional OSHA Committee members before asbestos removal occurs. Continued vigilance is the price of safety at all FAA facilities.

Editor's note: Wonder Makers is the environmental/industrial hygiene safety firm contracted to assist NATCA with complex issues, such as asbestos control, indoor air quality, fire safety, etc. Michael Pinto, Ph.D., is an industrial hygienist with the company.

The future of safety and technology

Doug Thompson, NATCA Safety Committee chair

Article 48 of our contract gives NATCA the right to participate on workgroups involved in major technological changes. Right now, approximately 40 of our fellow controllers are involved with various projects. Until now, the Safety Committee has kept track of the "hot" safety and technology issues and made policy recommendations based on input from field representatives. As a result, NATCA has been in a reactive mode much of the time.

As operators of the air traffic system, controllers are in the best possible position to determine its needs and requirements. Unfortunately, the Federal Aviation Administration has historically asked for our input only after a good portion of the engineering and design of a project were complete. The outcome is often equipment that doesn't quite meet our expectations, to say the least!

I've asked FAA officials why they don't include controllers in the initial design phase of projects clearly impacting their work. They commonly answer, "If I ask five controllers their opinion, I get five different answers." Well, that should be no surprise. Controllers are all very different individuals with diverse preferences and priorities. The FAA puts dozens of people on a single project and generally allows only one NATCA representative. This hapless individual, more often than not, is left alone to run the project. While help is often no more than a phone call away, many of our representatives don't have the background or experience to represent a true cross-section of the controller work force. In fact, that's an awful lot to ask. Many specialists the FAA assigns to projects represent every aspect of that bureaucratic behemoth, while our poor representative is often left to play the situation by ear.

Our people have done a truly magnificent job to date. Superior products have come out of projects where NATCA has participated. However, it's time for the Safety Committee to step forward and provide a better level of support for field representatives. Instead of the old product-specific policy recommendations, the committee will work with field representatives and other controllers to develop a list of conditions for a given capability. Instead of formulating a policy of being "for" or "against" a specific project, the committee will develop a list of criteria the equipment must meet. This list would become union policy against which our technical representatives can compare any program the FAA offers. This will eliminate the agency's argument that our representative "just doesn't like" a certain product. If it meets our needs for that capability, then it is acceptable to NATCA. If it does not meet the requirements, our field representatives will have a guide for steering the program's development. They can proceed with complete confidence and authority, knowing the full power of the union is behind every decision they make.