ATSAP Positives Bulletin

January 2016 through March 2016

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), along with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), developed a confidential voluntary non-punitive reporting system called the Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP). An ATSAP Positive is a safety issue that may otherwise not have been identified and therefore not resolved, were it not for the program. The list of ATSAP Positives grows every month and is additional proof that a program of this nature has the potential to proactively improve the overall safety of the National Airspace System (NAS).

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All ATSAP Resolutions were validated by the Service Area Event Review Committees (ERC) during the FY16Q2 reporting period.

Issue: At Tri-Cities Regional Airport (TRI), aircraft taxiing on TWY A to the northeast to the main ramp area encounter an area where the taxiway forks. Going straight places the aircraft on TWY B, but a right turn keeps the aircraft on TWY A. Because of poor signage, a high percentage of pilots miss the turn and taxi via TWY B versus making the turn to remain on TWY A. The issue becomes an operational distraction to controllers who have to constantly monitor each aircraft's taxi status and make corrections when the pilots miss the turn.
Potential Hazard: Lacking confidence in aircraft taxiing as cleared can be an operational distraction that takes the controllers' focus and attention away from other priority tasks.
Resolution: The facility worked with the Tri-Cities Regional Airport Authority to review options to mitigate the issue brought to light by the ATSAP Report. The result was new/better signage installed at the TWY A/B intersection that mitigates pilot confusion.

Issue: The ERC received a number of reports of jet fumes in the operational quarters of the Fayetteville Regional Airport (FAY) TRACON. The airport Fixed Base Operator (FBO) is located northeast of, and adjacent to, the TRACON. Corporate jets park with their nose into the wind. Therefore, when the wind is out of the northeast, the jet engines throw exhaust fumes toward the building. These fumes go directly into the air handler system for the FAY radar room. The fumes created a nuisance and distraction, and occasionally caused respiratory sickness in some FAY employees.
Potential Hazard: Any distraction (2014 Top 5 Hazard) in the operational area increases the chance of errors due to lack of focus on priority tasks.
Resolution: The information contained in the ATSAP Reports was used to support the funding of carbon filters to prevent fumes from entering the TRACON. These filters were installed at a cost of $15,000. The facility reports that the filters are working as designed.

Issue: The ERC received a report on an incident in which Boston ARTCC (ZBW) data showed an aircraft was on route ./.JUDDS CAM v487 LATTS./., but the aircraft made an unexpected turn off of that route and entered adjacent airspace. When queried, the pilot reported he had been issued ./.JUDDS SOARS v487 LATTS./., which was different than what ZBW was showing.
Potential Hazard: An aircraft that makes an unanticipated turn or flies a route other than expected can result in a Loss of Standard Separation (LoSS) or airspace deviation.
Resolution: The ZBW Airspace and Procedures office, in coordination with ZBW Field Automation Support Team (FAST), investigated the issue and discovered a routing disparity between New York ARTCC (ZNY) and ZBW computers. A critical Automation Issue Management System (AIMS) ticket was filed, and the issue was mitigated with a software change.

Issue: The ERC received a report from Miami ARTCC (ZMA) about an incident where aircraft were required to fly in close proximity to thunderstorms when communication with the Controlling Agency for Special Use Airspace (SUA) could not be established. Normally when aircraft begin deviating close to the SUA, ZMA can call the Controlling Agency and obtain a release of a portion of the SUA to them for a few minutes so aircraft can avoid the weather and get through the airspace

until other arrangements can be made--such as Traffic Management Unit (TMU) Reroutes around the weather.
Potential Hazard: With this SUA active and ZMA being unable to communicate with the Controlling Agency, aircraft were forced to fly into or close to active thunderstorms. Thunderstorms are one of the most dangerous aviation conditions that a flight can encounter, and they can produce hazards such as severe turbulence, low level wind shear, hail, and lightning, each of which can be disastrous.
Resolution: In investigating the event, it was discovered there were no Letters of Agreement in place between the Scheduling Agency and ZMA establishing protocol in the event the Controlling Agency was unavailable and ZMA needed to encroach on the active SUA. An initiative was undertaken and implemented to establish a procedure that aids Miami Center's operation to communicate with the Scheduling Agency when the Controlling Agency is unavailable.

Issue: The sunrise/sunset alarm for the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG) Control Tower Field Lighting System control panels had not worked properly for several months. The equipment provides an audible alarm to notify the tower that it is time to change airfield lighting from "Day" to "Night" settings. The panels are located in the CVG Tower Cab, but belong to the Cincinnati Airport Authority.
Potential Hazard: During busy periods, official sunset can easily occur without the tower personnel realizing it. The result can be aircraft operating without the required lighting settings in place.
Resolution: After the facility coordinated with the airport authority, an airport electrician and system programmer repaired the lighting system where the sunrise/sunset alarm now operates as designed.

Issue: The CSA ERC received multiple reports indicating that Notice to Airmen (NOTAM)s were remaining in effect past the Estimated (EST) date. Since controllers are required to provide pilots with all relevant NOTAMs, this discrepancy caused confusion about the status of the specified outage/closure.
Potential Hazard: Uncertainty among the controller workforce about the currency/accuracy of NOTAMs may lead to safety information not being relayed accurately, and this is a potential safety issue for pilots who require current information for flight planning and inflight safety.
Resolution: The US NOTAM office became aware of the safety issue through the ATSAP Information Request (AIR) submitted to them by the CSA ERC. The concerned parties were able to ascertain the scope of the issue via follow-up TELCONs with the ERC and continued communication with the ATSAP Analysis Team (AAT). The US NOTAM office recognized the safety issue, proposed the necessary changes and implemented the recommendations of the Safety Risk Management (SRM) Panel. The JO7930.2Q now requires NOTAMs with "EST" times to self-cancel once they have reached the expiration time.

Issue: A submitter from Minneapolis-St. Paul (MSP) Tower reported a safety issue with strip board podiums at several operational positions. The strip board podiums were designed and welded together in the 1980s by controllers themselves and had not been updated since. The submitter reported witnessing numerous incidents of controllers pinching fingers, crushing hands, and strips falling off the board and onto the floor during busy traffic, while attempting to adjust the podium.
Potential Hazard: Duty related distractions and workload were increasing due to the strip board podiums improperly working.

Resolution: MSP facility leadership had requested replacements in the past but the replacement continued to be delayed due to budget constraints and other obstacles. By sharing the information provided to them by the Event Review Committee (ERC) via the ATSAP InfoShare process, the facility leadership was able to elevate the safety concerns and leverage the extra funds to revamp the strip podiums and has relayed to the CSA ERC that they are working as requested.

Issue: At Albuquerque International Sunport Airport (ABQ), the National Weather Service (NWS) is just south of the approach end of RWY 8 and releases weather balloons at that location daily. A submitter at ABQ Tower reported uncertainty about what jurisdiction, if any, tower controllers have over the NWS releasing balloons and what the controllers' responsibility is pertaining to the NWS balloon launching operation.
Potential Hazard: Uncertainty about controller responsibility during the NWS balloon launch in the vicinity of climbing or descending aircraft could lead to inadequate advanced warnings to pilots and possibly last minute evasive maneuvers.
Resolution: ABQ facility leadership became aware of the submitters concerns through the ATSAP InfoShare process, and facility leadership submitted the issue to the Local Safety Council (LSC) for review/action. Upon further review, it was determined that the issue was caused by a breakdown in communication; ABQ tower has total jurisdiction over the airspace and can deny access to the airspace if traffic is a factor. Official recommendation from the LSC was that a crew briefing be provided regarding NWS balloon release practice/procedures. The LSC recommendation was accepted and briefings were completed.

Issue: A submitter from Houston Intercontinental Airport (IAH) Tower relayed to the ERC that intensity of the runway 26L approach lights were set to Step 2 continuously and when another intensity was needed, it could only be changed by Tech Ops. It reportedly takes about 30 minutes from the time Tech Ops receives the call until the intensity change is completed. The condition had been logged and existed for about 4 months prior to the ERC receiving the report.
Potential Hazard: Tower controllers could not increase the intensity of the approach lights as needed for pilots during periods of low ceiling/visibility in a timely manner.
Resolution: As part of the ATSAP InfoShare process, facility leadership relayed to the ERC that part of the problem was that the party responsible for correcting the problem had not been determined. The safety concerns being reported through ATSAP appeared to help the correction process gain momentum, and the approach lights are again fully operational and the ability of the controller to set the intensity settings are no longer restricted.

Issue: A submitter from Dallas-Fort Worth TRACON (D10) reported that airspace maps in the Information Display System (IDS5) system were not all current, leaving uncertainty in some areas as to who had jurisdiction of that airspace.
Potential Hazard: Uncertainty of who has jurisdiction of airspace can lead to a loss of separation.
Resolution: As a result of the ATSAP InfoShare process, D10 facility leadership became aware of the issue and reported that the identified airspace map was the result of a "bad link" that provided outdated information. The problem was resolved and verified, and the correct map and boundaries are now displayed.

Issue: A submitter at Louis Armstrong International Airport (MSY) Radar Approach Control reported a difference of opinion among the controllers on whether or not Tower has initial radar

separation responsibility for successive IFR departures off of the same runway with the same heading.
Potential Hazard: Uncertainty about who has separation responsibility can lead to loss of standard separation.
Resolution: When the facility leadership became aware of the confusion as part of the ATSAP InfoShare process, they monitored the situation and retrieved necessary data to determine if the issue was systemic or isolated. The issue was turned over to the Local Safety Council (LSC) to incorporate into the LSC's monthly Best Practices briefing. The briefing included a review of MSY procedures, which clearly define the Local Controller's responsibility to provide the initial separation.

Issue: A submitter explained that new procedures were implemented for ground metering at Chicago Midway International Airport (MDW). As part of the new procedures, the ground control backup frequency, which was also designated to be used by the Chicago Fire Department during accidents or incidents, was re-designated as a second Clearance Delivery frequency dedicated for ground metering. Ground Control no longer had a back-up and Clearance Delivery, now with two frequencies, was experiencing frequency congestion, pilots talking over each other, and general confusion.
Potential Hazard: Communication breakdown between Clearance Delivery and Pilots may lead to hearback/readback errors, downstream pilot deviations, and separation errors.
Resolution: The information was shared with MDW facility leadership as part of the ATSAP InfoShare process and as a result, the issue was turned over to the Local Safety Council (LSC) for resolution. According to the manager, all recommendations from the LSC were implemented to include using the original Clearance Delivery frequency as the primary for metering. Facility leadership reports that this measure resolved the cited safety issues.

Issue: A submitter from General Mitchell International Airport (MKE) Radar Approach Control reported that the East Departure drop tube was malfunctioning. The strips went down the tube and upon hitting the end of the tube ejected in random directions (i.e., behind the tube opening, on the floor directly under the opening, 6ft. or more across the room, etc.). At times, controllers reportedly could not find the strip in a timely manner and resorted to obtaining the flight data information from the pilot rather than the strip.
Potential Hazard: Increases controller and pilot workload and duty related distractions; may also negatively affect pilots' confidence in ATC.
Resolution: Additional focus was given to the issue as part of the ATSAP InfoShare process and facility leadership was able to work together with Tech Ops to have the problem fully mitigated.

Issue: A submitter from James M Cox Dayton International Airport (DAY) reported a problem with a scanner used at the Local Control position. The report indicated that anytime the scanner is moved it stops working. In order to get the equipment to work, the Local Controller must turn the scanner over and firmly press a connector; this procedure was repeated according to the report about four times a day.
Potential Hazard: Increases workload and duty related distractions at the Local Control Position.
Resolution: Upon receiving the ATSAP InfoShare from the CSA ERC, the facility leadership worked together to resolve the issue. Tech Ops ordered and installed the parts necessary to repair the scanner connection.

Issue: A submitter from Bismarck (BIS) Radar Approach Control reported a lack of the required information (i.e., Notice to Airmen (NOTAM)s and Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS) information) for satellite airports readily available at the control positions. The report also indicated the approach plates are out of date and to obtain the current information, controllers had to use the Tower cab computer, which is reportedly too slow.
Potential Hazard: Lack of accurate information readily available at the control positions can lead to pertinent information not being relayed to pilots as necessary.
Resolution: After reviewing the ATSAP data, as part of the ATSAP InfoShare process, BIS facility leadership relayed to the ERC that they will pursue the acquisition of IDS equipment to be located next to the radar position throughout the district. In the meantime, the approach plates located next to the radar position have been updated and will remain current until the IDS equipment is in place. Also, pertinent NOTAMs for satellite airports are posted on the Status Information Area (SIA) located next to the radar position.

Issue: A submitter from Minneapolis Center (ZMP) reported that when combining sectors, ZMP controllers did not forward the En Route Information Display (ERID)s to the new sector.
Potential Hazard: Pertinent information such as NOTAMs and PIREPs were left on the original screen rather than being easily available at the combined position.
Resolution: As a result of the ATSAP InfoShare process, the ZMP local orders were updated to reflect proper configuration requirements and the new requirement was verbally briefed to operational personnel.

Issue: A submitter identified a concern that some Minneapolis Center (ZMP) personnel are not familiar with the process for handling flights that cross the border into U.S. domestic airspace. Aircraft crossing the US/Canadian border are required to file either an IFR or Defense VFR (DVFR) flight plan prior to departure, and have a functioning transponder with an ATC assigned code.
Potential Hazard: Aircraft crossing the border without using the proper security protocol may be subject to Military interrogation procedures.
Resolution: ZMP facility leadership became aware of this concern via the ATSAP InfoShare process and provided a pre-duty refresher briefing to the workforce via Comprehensive Electronic Data Analysis and Reporting (CEDAR). The briefing explained that "*When requested by a VFR pilot, controllers should obtain a discrete beacon code from ERAM and assign it to the flight. There is no requirement for the flight or beacon code to be reported over the Domestic Events Network, however, if asked by FAA HQ, the East or West Air Defense Sector, or Customs & Border Protection about the identity of the flight, ZMP must have a record (via ERAM) of the aircraft registration that was assigned that discrete code*."

Issue: A submitter from Minneapolis Center identified confusion among the work force on proper procedure to access NOTAMs for Canadian Airports. Some thought that Flight Data updated the NOTAMs in ERIDs and that those in ERIDs were current and available for use. Others thought that, for current NOTAMs, they were to request them from the supervisor who in turn would retrieve them from an Internet site.
Potential Hazard: Ambiguity about local NOTAM retrieval procedures can lead to confusion and result in the relaying of inaccurate information to pilots about anomalies/closures and outages in the NAS.
Resolution: As part of the ATSAP InfoShare process, the facility conducted an internal analysis

and was able to identify an area of concern in regard to the availability of NOTAMs for Canadian Airports to U.S. controllers. As a result, the ZMP procedures office prepared a briefing to clarify interim procedures for obtaining Canadian NOTAMs until a long term solution can be established through collaboration between NAV Canada and Lockheed Martin FSS. The interim solution was published in ZMP N7110.127 and provided as a pre-duty briefing item to the workforce via CEDAR.

Issue: A submitter from Kansas City Center (ZKC) reported that when a controller returns a failing headset at ZKC, they are given a headset that was previously returned for failures and but not repaired.
Potential Hazard: Faulty communication equipment can lead to missed transmissions, hearback/readback errors and loss of standard separation.
Resolution: As part of the ATSAP InfoShare process, ZKC facility leadership relayed to the CSA ERC that they had a working process in place for testing the headset to determine which component failed. The failed components are then either returned for warranty or discarded if they are out of warranty. Also, parts that passed the test were recycled back into inventory for redistribution and if returned a second time, are then discarded. They discovered that due to the retirement of the facility's primary focal for headsets, the tracking process had not been consistently applied. They corrected the issue and also instituted an amendment to the process. When a CPC returns a headset with a problem, the CPC will be issued a new headset. The normal testing process will continue, but those components that pass the test will only be issued to new trainees that arrive at ZKC. The logic is that the trainee will use them first in the simulation lab providing opportunity to discover any intermittent problems before working live traffic. If any of those reissued components are returned, they will be discarded.

Issue: A submitter from Anchorage (ZAN) ARTCC reported inconsistent methods by different Front Line Managers/Controller in Charge (FLM's/CIC)'s when configuring ATOP Sectors. A review and refresher needs to be addressed on sectorization along with the assignment of airspace to the workstations.
Potential Hazard: The ability to dynamically split and sectorize is a great benefit and very useful when addressing the varying traffic flows and dynamic needs to even-out workloads; it can be complex and needs to be briefed more often.
Resolution: A CIC/FLM checklist has been created. The facility has also created a designated re-sectorization binder for reference.

Issue: A submitter from Long Beach, CA (LGB) Tower reported that the elevator has been out of service at the facility since November 10, 2015, the heating in the base building has been out since November 25, 2015, and the air conditioning in the tower cab has been working intermittently since November 30, 2015. During this time, the janitorial staff has not been up to the tower cab to clean.
Potential Hazard: CPC's are choosing at times to take their break in the tower cab as opposed to walking down 196 stairs. The general health and wellness is suffering due to the deteriorating conditions.
Resolution: The elevator has been repaired and all janitorial functions have resumed.

Issue: A submitter from Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) Tower reported there is no organized or dedicated space available for ready reference binders and airport restrictions for each of

the control positions of the Tower cab. All reference materials are randomly placed around the cab.
Potential Hazard: Reference materials not readily available create the need for controllers to leave position to search for the material.
Resolution: The binders have been re-organized and placed in one location and will be automated when the new IDS-R is brought on line.

Issue: A submitter from Concord, CA (CCR) Tower reported that they receive approach control services from Travis AFB (SUU) Approach Control, and the RADAR feed comes from Northern California TRACON (NCT). The display data at CCR does not match what SUU Approach shows. Additionally, data tags are dropping from the display and bad position correlation and poor RADAR coverage are common. SUU RADAR does not interface with CCR's RADAR feed from NCT.
Potential Hazard: Incorrect data blocks can lead to incorrect identification of aircraft.
Resolution: An FTI line between SUU and CCR was installed, and the problem is resolved. The changes were briefed to controllers.

Issue: A submitter from San Francisco (SFO) Tower reported that since CARTS FUSION RADAR was turned on, there are numerous incidents of "stitching", or target jumping, occurring on the SFO Finals Position. This "stitching" was generated by multiple RADAR feeds causing targets to jump.
Potential Hazard: Target "stitching" makes it difficult to accurately track aircraft resulting in receiving an inaccurate aircraft location.
Resolution: Submitted ATSAP reports compelled Tech Ops to look at possible fixes to the problem. Tech Ops settled on shutting down FUSION at SFO and going to a single-sensor adaptation.

Issue: A submitter from San Jose CA (SJC) Tower reported when SJC is on RWY's 12, the TECKY departure strips assign the LOSHN transition in the preferential departure routing, and the TECKY2 departure has a note that says RWY's 12L/R LOSHN transition "*NA*".
Potential Hazard: The controller will expect the pilot to fly one procedure when actually the pilot flies another.
Resolution: Oakland ARTCC (ZOA) has changed automation to assign the proper Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and transition.

Issue: A National Association of Government Employees (NAGE) submitter from Chicago ARTCC (ZAU) reported that the ZAU Flight Data Position Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) does not address flight plan removal procedures for aircraft departing from airports other than O'Hare (ORD) or Midway (MDW). Occasionally, a dispatcher will call and ask for flight plan removal from aircraft departing airports that border other ZAU boundaries. When this happens, the flight plan removal is not received at the adjacent facility.
Potential Hazard: Without procedures in place, there is a risk of removing flight plans of aircraft that could either be airborne or departing soon.
Resolution: New procedures are in place and Flight Data personnel (and controllers) have been briefed.

Issue: A NAGE submitter from Washington ARTCC (ZDC) reports that the ZDC practice of substituting one airport's altimeter for another airport altimeter is not a proper solution and is a

safety violation. Airports have approach plate directions on what is a viable altimeter alternative and what additional heights in the approach needs to be added or taken into account. If the approach plate does not publish an alternative, then no substitute is available.
Potential Hazard: Random insertion of another airport's altimeter into a weather sequence is potentially false and inaccurate information could lead to an accident.
Resolution: ZDC has created and implemented negotiated procedures to address the altimeter issues. These procedures have been added to the revised SOP and all Flight Data Control Specialists (FDCS) have been trained.

Issue: A submitter from Joshua Control Facility (JCF), Edwards AFB CA reported that U2 and other high performance aircraft are departing Palmdale (PMD) Airport and climbing at high rates of climb. A need exists for a "rolling call" (notification from the Tower to the Departure controller that an aircraft is on departure roll) on these aircraft to avoid traffic in-bound to the Los Angeles Basin.
Potential Hazard: The high speed aircraft are climbing so fast that JCF controllers are oftentimes unable to restrict them before they conflict with other aircraft.
Resolution: The LOA has been changed requiring PMD Tower to call JCF with a "rolling call" where control instructions can then be provided on a timelier basis.

Issue: A submitter from Joshua Control Facility (JCF) reported that the Southern California Logistics Airport (VCV) VOR/DME is out of service; it has been for a couple of years, and there was no plan for it to return to service. The VOR/DME and the ILS require DME or RADAR. They have DME ARCS. There is no NOTAM on the VOR being OTS, and it is only published in the Airport Facility Directory. Aircraft are requesting approaches off of the VOR that are currently not flyable.
Potential Hazard: The lack of a functional VOR and the non-cancellation of approaches requiring that VOR, along with no published NOTAMS can create a potentially hazardous situation for aircraft that expect the equipment to be fully functional.
Resolution: The ATSAP was filed and shared with AJV. The result is a re-commission of the VOR (after repairs) and the equipment along with the approach. The FCC license was obtained in January 2014. Subsequently, the repair work was completed and the equipment is fully functional. As a result, the VOR/DME approach was published on 3/31/2016.

Issue: A submitter from Las Vegas NV (LAS) Tower reported that Nellis AFB made a change to the way they hand off helicopters to LAS Tower. LAS Tower airspace transits helicopters at or below 3,000 feet MSL. Nellis Tower used to work the helicopters in their airspace and when they needed to transit to LAS airspace, they would call for a handoff. Without any notice, Nellis Approach took away the airspace from Nellis Tower. Nellis Approach has had issues trying to call LAS tower for these hand-offs. Occasionally Nellis Approach will call LAS Tower, however sometimes they do not know how to call us, so they call for a hand-off over an actual telephone line to the FLM desk.
Potential Hazard: Hand-offs via commercial phone line (not recorded) and away from control positions are distracting and divert controller attention from operations.
Resolution: Nellis has identified this as a performance issue by individuals and has corrected the problem.

Issue: A submitter from Oakland ARTCC (ZOA) reported that the AANET1 RNAV STAR into Metropolitan Oakland International Airport (OAK) terminates in ARTCC airspace at waypoint RAIDR. Northern California TRACON (NCT) Grove sector often does not accept a hand off in time for aircraft to be assigned course guidance by the TRACON after RAIDR. Pilots are questioning the ARTCC for guidance that is appropriately assigned by the TRACON.
Potential Hazard: Course guidance and clearance routing in a timely manner.
Resolution: A briefing was issued to Area North personnel by the Airspace and Procedures Office. The briefing advised that if the handoff is not taken in a timely fashion, ZOA is to clear the aircraft direct ALCAT after RAIDR. ALCAT is inside NCT airspace and is the initial fix for approaches to RWY 12.

Issue: A submitter from Denver ARTCC (ZDV) reported that ZDV has been having a problem with repeated non-compliance from surrounding facilities/areas regarding shortcuts on their RNAV stars into DEN. LOA/SOP routes for RNAV STARs are spelled out clearly and shortcuts adversely affect the ability to sequence effectively and also add to delays when metering. They also are causing the area increased coordination to get control of aircraft that wouldn't be in certain areas had proper procedures been followed.
Potential Hazard: The non-adherence to established procedures and agreements can lead to aircraft appearing in unexpected locations and potentially hazardous situations.
Resolution: Facility leadership ensured the completion of crew breakouts with both areas using the professional standards approach.

Issue: A submitter from John Wayne Airport, CA (SNA) reported that when the facility switches to North traffic, RWY's 02L/R, the Local 1 and 2 controllers, Ground controller, and LA-1 change sitting positions in the Tower cab. The LC1 and GC swap sitting positions. The LA-1 moves to the LC2 position and the LC2 moves to the GCW position. The CIC initiates a north traffic configuration for the Enhanced Terminal Voice Switch System (ETVS) and all the controllers select the recon, or reconfiguration, button at the position. The problem is the recon only changes which speaker a shout line comes out of. It does not change the buttons to accomplish inter-facility coordination with controllers.
Potential Hazard: It can be confusing trying to figure out which position each controller is plugged in to.
Resolution: Digital Voice Recorder System (DVRS) has been re-configured to accommodate the flow change and eliminate the confusion.

Issue: A submitter from Los Angeles International (LAX) Tower reported that Aircraft Design Groups (ADG) Type 6 (Airbus-388) aircraft are not identified via automation on RADAR displays in the Tower and sometimes proper preparation for such aircraft is overlooked.
Potential Hazard: Separation standards are different with this type of aircraft but no indicator is available and sometimes the proper separation is missed by controllers.
Resolution: Automation modification has been implemented that will easily identify Group 6 aircraft.

Issue: A submitter from Seattle TRACON (S46) reported that there are conflicting procedures in the S46 LOA and SOP regarding inbound Boeing Field (BFI) small aircraft vs aircraft on missed approach at Seattle Tacoma International Airport (SEA).

Potential Hazard: Under certain circumstances the missed approach at SEA will be in direct conflict with the BFI inbound aircraft.
Resolution: The facility SOP has been revised to eliminate the conflicting procedure.

Issue: A submitter from Salt Lake ARTCC (ZLC) reported that the target symbol for either primary targets or 3-mile eligibility must be changed to alleviate any confusion and misapplication of rules that would put an aircraft, without a transponder, in a situation where the controller thinks reduced separation and more lax rules are available.
Potential Hazard: The indicator on the scope for an aircraft being eligible for 3 mile separation is nearly identical to a primary target's symbol. The controller may be misled by lack of symbology that identifies aircraft flying in an area where only three miles of separation is required.
Resolution: The Free/Flat Track Font was changed from a "4" to a "5" eliminating the problem and subsequent negative reports.

Issue: A submitter from North Las Vegas (VGT) Tower reported that the current LOA does not give the aircraft clearance through Class Delta airspace on the Red Rock Arrival, but does give clearance into Class Bravo airspace.
Potential Hazard: The aircraft should either call VGT for a Delta transition or contact LAS Tower outside of Class Delta airspace allowing LAS Tower to coordinate the transition prior to entering. Due to very poor radar coverage below 035 this may be difficult. The procedure itself may need to be readdressed entirely.
Resolution: The LOA has been reviewed and edited to allow for the procedure to be accomplished without coordination.

Issue: Submitters from San Francisco International Tower (SFO) report that Delta Airlines (DAL) Airlines Boeing-757 Aircraft frequently have an issue with their push clearance into and around the spot 5 area. This seems to be a systemic issue with DAL B-757 aircraft out of gates 41 & 43. The SFO SOP says they can push into the alley to spot 5, however, there are times when the crew receives this clearance, comes back and says we need to push onto taxiway A., or in the rare occurrence push onto taxiway A without a clearance.
Potential Hazard: The problem appears to be issues with breaking tow bars and conforming with control instructions that could lead to unexpected movements.
Resolution: DAL Ramp Manager has agreed to instruct all crews to advise Ground Control of any movement other than what is cleared.

Issue: A submitter from Sonoma County Airport (STS) Tower reported that STS has TWY A which runs parallel to RWY 14. RWY 20 crosses RWY 14 near the approach end, but does not cross TWY A. To taxi for a full length departure on RWY 14, an aircraft has to cross through the RWY 20 approach area. The area has been a source of confusion for many pilots due to lack of signage.
Potential Hazard: Aircraft have crossed the runway without authorization on several occasions.
Resolution: The Airport management has installed signage instructing aircraft to contact STS Tower before crossing.