MODULE 1

Introduction and Overview

Class Overview

1 Introduction / NATCA's Role in Safety

2 Individual Performance

3 Safety Reporting

4 Partnership for Safety

5 Service Reviews & Corrective Action Plans

6 Follow-On Activities

7 Accident & Incident Response

8 Safety Management System

9 Local RSAT

10 Safety Review

MODULE 1 OBJECTIVES

- Recognize NATCA's role in maintaining the safety of the National Airspace System

- Understand the general safety processes that are used at the national and local levels to identify and correct safety issues

Module 2 References:

- NATCA National Constitution
- CBA
  - Article 114
  - Appendix P-8, Sec. 7
- Air Safety Investigation (ASI) Committee Charter
- National Safety & Technology Leadership Council (NSTLC) Charter
- National Safety Committee (NSC) Charter
- MOU dated 9-18-2020
- JO 7210.634A

CBA Articles:	112: Corrective Action Requests/Plans
6: Representation Rights	113: Runway Safety
29: Excused Absence	114: Collaboration
51: Facility Evaluation, Audits, and Assessments	119: Covered Event Review
52: Professional Standards	122: Partnership for Safety
55: Human Performance	123: Safety Management System
62: ASRS	Appendix O: ATSAP
63: NTSB Union Representatives	Appendix P-1: Implementation of the Credentialing and CTO Certification Programs
64: Safety Events Reporting and Review	Appendix P-5: Air Traffic Safety Guidance (ATO-SG)
65: Controllers/Employee Performance	Appendix P-6: ATO Fatigue Risk Management System/FSSC Charter
74: Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM)	Appendix P-8: Safety Personnel
95: Individual Performance	

Quick Preview: Collaboration

- Service Reviews:
  - System Service Review (SSR)
  - Covered Event Review (CER)
  - Traffic Management Review (TMR)
  - Systemic Issue Review (SYSIR)
- Corrective Action Plan (CAP)
- Safety Risk Management Panel (SRMP)
- Internal/External Compliance Verifications (ICV/ECV)
- Quality Control Validations
- Services Rendered Telephone Conferences (SRT)*

*SRTs are **not** safety processes

Quick Preview: Mitigating Risk

DATA COLLECTION PROCESSES	DATA ANALYSIS PROCESSES	CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESSES
Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP)	Event Review Committee (ERC)	ATSAP Corrective Action Requests (ATSAP CAR)
ATSAP-X	Barrier Analysis Review (BAR)	Runway Safety Action Plan (RSAP)
Confidential Information Sharing Program (CISP)	QC Service Reviews (i.e., SSR, TMR, CER, SYSIR)	Quality Assurance Corrective Action Plan (QA CAR)
Mandatory Occurrence Reports (MOR)	Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS)	Safety Management System (SMS) Safety Requirements
Preliminary ARIA Reports (PAR)	Safety Risk Management Panels (SRMP)	Facility Corrective Action Plan
Quality Control Operational Skills Assessments (QC OSA)	Partnership for Safety (PFS)	National Corrective Action Plan

Safety Overview

Safety Programs

Quick Preview: Parallel Safety Programs

MODULE 2

Individual Performance

MODULE 2 OBJECTIVES

- Recognize the tools that can be used to conduct performance management
- Understand the performance management processes

Module 3 References:

- CBA
  - Article 64
  - Article 95
- JO 3400.20
- JO 7210.634A
- JO 7200.20B

IPM Tools

- Performance Discussions
- Performance Records of Conference (PRoC)
- Individual Performance Management Operational Skills Assessment (IPM OSA)
- Skill Enhancement Training (SET)

The administration of IPM is not based on a single snapshot, event, or reported occurrence, but is an on-going assessment of overall observed employee performance.

JO 3400.20 Paragraph 5a(2)

Individual Performance Administration

Let's chat:

When is IPM being done right, and when is it being done wrong? Do you have any examples?

JO 3400.20 Paragraph 5a(2)

Individual Performance Process

1. Observing and Identifying Performance
2. Discussing Performance
3. Documenting Performance
4. IPM OSA
5. Training

Background Information

QC OSA

Quality Control is separate from performance management activities. QC OSAs are a means to collect data and measure organizational performance.

A QC OSA must not be used as the basis of, or to support individual performance management (IPM). Employee's identifiable information will not be associated with the OSA.

Potential systemic non-compliant/risk identified in QC OSAs must be analyzed through the service review or the compliance verification processes in order to validate and understand the potential issue.

VS

IPM OSA

IPM is separate and distinct from the QC process. An IPM OSA is a supplemental tool for IPM to address an on-going performance deficiency.

IPM OSAs are not to be conducted unless an ongoing performance deficiency has been identified and documented.

May be conducted through direct or remote monitoring, live observation, or playback tools

Where such capabilities exist, a replay and/or voice recording of the session must be included in any discussion about the OSA.

Conducted by employee's direct supervisor

JO 7210.634A Ch. 3-2
JO 3400.20 Paragraph 5a(2)

Individual Performance Key Points

- QC OSAs are a method of systemic data collection and may not be used to trigger IPM
- QC activities must not generate or be used as a source of IPM follow-up activities, and are not to be attributed to an individual employee
- When justification for the assignment of SET includes safety events and/or problems accepted into ATSAP, the facility must submit any SET and IPM OSA proposals to the ATSAP Event Review Committee (ERC) for approval

Individual Performance Key Points

To comply with the Orders and CBA, facilities must operate QC as a systemic (de-identified) data collection process, and perform IPM as separate process following the specific steps outlined in JO 3400.20

Individual Performance Management

Individual Performance Management:

What happens if the IPM processes do not work?

What does administration of IPM look like when done correctly?

MODULE 3

Safety Reporting

MODULE 3 OBJECTIVES

- Understand reporting requirements
- Recognize when an ATSAP does/does not meet the reporting requirements
- Define a significant event
- Identify when a personnel statement is required

Module 4 References:

- CBA Article 64
- JO 7210.632A
- JO 7200.20B
- JO 1030.3B
- JO 8020.16C

Employee Responsibilities.

(1) Employees must ensure that all occurrences of which they are aware, through either direct involvement or observation, are reported. All personnel with knowledge of an occurrence are encouraged to report even if it results in multiple submissions of the same occurrence.

JO 7210.632 2-3b

Mandatory Occurrence Report Categories

- Airborne loss of separation
- Airport surface loss of separation
- Unmanned aerial system
- Terrain/obstruction
- Airborne anomaly not involving loss of separation
- Airport environment
- Oceanic
- Communication
- Emergency or in-flight hazard
- Inquiry

Airborne Loss of Separation

- Any suspected loss of separation involving non-radar standards.
- Any suspected loss of separation involving VFR aircraft in Class B and C airspace, TRSA, or practice VFR approaches.
- Any suspected loss of radar separation involving IFR aircraft other than as a result of compression on final approach.

JO 7210.632A

Unmanned Aerial System

Any instance where a pilot reports or air traffic control (ATC) becomes aware of unauthorized UAS activity or authorized UAS activity that is conducted in an unsafe or hazardous manner. For authorized UAS activities conducted in an unsafe manner, please note in the MOR the Certificate of Authorization (COA) number, when available, and the violation that occurred.

JO 7210.632A

Airport Surface Loss of Separation

- Any ground surveillance alert [Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE) or Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS)] between:
  - Two aircraft
  - An aircraft and a vehicle.
- Any suspected loss of runway/airport surface separation between:
  - Two aircraft
  - An aircraft and a vehicle
  - An aircraft and a pedestrian

JO 7210.632A

Terrain/Obstruction

- Any suspected loss of separation between an IFR aircraft and terrain or obstacles; for example, operations below minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) or minimum IFR altitude (MIA).
- Any operation of a VFR aircraft in proximity to terrain or obstructions that the employee providing air traffic services determines affected the safety of flight. These occurrences normally result in ATC issuing a safety alert or control action.

Airborne Air Traffic Control Anomaly (Airspace/Altitude/Route/Speed) Not Involving a Loss of Separation.

- Any instance in which an aircraft enters airspace on anything other than the expected or intended altitude, routing, or airspeed, or without a point-out or hand-off.
- Any instance where an aircraft operates at an altitude, routing, or airspeed that the employee providing air traffic services determines affected the safety of flight or operations. These occurrences normally result in ATC issuing a safety alert or control action. All non-loss TCAS-RAs and/or spillouts must be reported under this MOR.
- Any occurrence where an aircraft enters special use airspace (for example, a warning area, military operations area, or ATC-assigned airspace) without coordination and/or authorization.

NOTE – *A suspected anomaly not involving loss of separation that occurs in oceanic airspace is covered in Appendix A, paragraph 8, Oceanic Environment.*

Airport Environment

- The presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or pedestrian on any movement area or runway safety area not expected/intended by ATC.
- Any instance in which an aircraft unexpectedly lands or departs, or attempts to land or depart, a runway or surface. All ASDE Taxiway Arrival Prediction (ATAP) alerts are captured under this MOR.
- Any instance in which an aircraft lands or departs on, or flies an unrestricted low approach to, a closed runway (or portion thereof).
- Any go-around initiated by either a flight crew or ATC involving turbojet aircraft within a half mile of the arrival threshold not involving practice approaches.
- Any instance in which any part of the aircraft has crossed over the runway hold-short line and the controller cancels the takeoff or the flight crew aborts the takeoff.
- Any instance in which an aircraft unintentionally maneuvers off the runway/taxiway.
- Any improper/unexpected presence of a vehicle or aircraft inside the instrument landing system (ILS) critical area.

Oceanic

Any instance where aircraft operating in oceanic airspace are suspected of:

- Losing separation.
- Operating at a time, altitude, routing, or reporting point other than what was expected/cleared.
- Not maintaining communication (to include timely position or other reports) as required or expected/intended resulting in additional notifications/queries, or alternative actions by ATC or a flight crew.
- Experiencing an Emergency or In-Flight Hazard

Communication

Except for occurrences in oceanic airspace (which are reported inAppendix A, paragraph 8), any instance in which communication with an aircraft was not established or not maintained as expected/intended and results in alternative control actions or additional notifications by ATC or a flight crew or in a landing without a clearance.

NOTE – *Examples of "additional notifications" would include notifications required according to FAA Order JO 1030.3 or to the Domestic Events Network for NORDO aircraft.*

Emergency or In-Flight Hazard

The following are provided as examples and are not intended to be all-inclusive.

NOTE – *Emergency or in-flight hazards may be declared by ATC, flight crew, facility personnel, or officials responsible for the operation of the aircraft.*

- Medical emergency
- Inflight equipment malfunction requiring special handling
- Passenger/flight crew injury due to turbulence other than wake
- Fuel quantity
- Pilot disorientation
- VFR pilot in or trapped on top of clouds
- Laser light illumination
- Hijack
- Bomb threat
- Bird strike
- Other

Inquiry

Any expression of concern or inquiry by any external entity, to include a flight crew, to a management official/CIC or to ATC on the radio concerning:

- The proximity or operation of an aircraft, either airborne or on the surface, including NMAC notifications from a flight crew.
- An upset, pitch, or roll attributed to wake turbulence from another aircraft.

NOTE – *The AIM instructs pilots, when notifying ATC of a wake event, to be as descriptive as possible (e.g., bank angle, altitude deviations, intensity, duration of event).*

Safety Reporting Requirements

Who has to file? MOR or ATSAP?

All employees must ensure that these occurrences, of which they are aware, through either direct involvement or observation, are reported.

These occurrences or conditions must be reported using the mandatory occurrence report (MOR) process described in this directive or in FAA Order JO 7200.20A, Voluntary Safety Reporting Program (VSRP).

Submission of a VSRP report satisfies non-management employees' requirement to report according to this directive except when the employee providing air traffic services determines that pilot actions affected the safety of operations. When such a determination is made, pilot actions must also be reported as an MOR in accordance with paragraphs 2-9.

JO 7210.632A Appendix A

Safety Reporting Requirements

Employee Responsibilities.

(2) Non-management employees eligible to participate in a VSRP such as Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP) may satisfy the reporting requirements of this directive by reporting occurrences through those programs, except as specified in FAA Order JO 7200.20A and this order.

(3) Management employees must report occurrences according to this directive. In addition, if eligible to participate they may also file a VSRP report.

JO 7210.632A 2-3b

Safety Reporting Requirements

Non-management Employees Acting in a Management Role.

The responsibilities of employees performing this function (for example, controller-in-charge) vary based on the situation. When reporting according to the FAA Order JO 7210.632A is required, a VSRP report may also be filed.

- If the employee observes a developing event, he/she must take action to correct the situation and must report according to the FAA Order JO 7210.632A.
- If an event is reported to an employee performing this function, he/she must report according to the FAA Order JO 7210.632A.
- If the employee is directly involved in or observes an event, other than as described in paragraph 3-3.b.(1), he/she must report following either FAA Order JO 7210.632A or the VSRP, or he/she may report through both.
  - *"Directly involved" means working CIC combined with an operational position*

JO 7200.20A 3-3

Safety Reporting Requirements

Management employees must report occurrences according to JO 7210.632A. In addition, if eligible to participate they may also file a VSRP report.

JO 7200.20A 3-3

Safety Reporting Requirements

Submission of a VSRP report does not exempt employees from making appropriate notifications when the employee providing air traffic services determines an occurrence involved national security or the immediate safety of flight (for example, in-flight emergencies, overdue aircraft, no radio [NORDO]/no radio acknowledgement [NORAC] aircraft, aircraft accidents).

What are "appropriate notifications?"

JO 7210.632A A.1.b
JO 7200.20A 3-3

Significant Event

Any event in the NAS that may attract regional/national media attention or regional/national political attention, any aircraft proximity with less than 33 percent of the standard, any report of a Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC) with evasive action, or any major event that requires immediate upward notification to the Service Area or Headquarters level. **Note:** this list is not all-inclusive.

JO 1030.3B

Personnel Statements

CBA: Signed employee statements will only be required in the event of a pilot deviation.

JO 8020.16: Personnel statements are not required for aircraft accidents/incidents. Personnel statements must be completed when an employee providing air traffic services determines that pilot, airman, or other's actions may have violated the Code of Federal Regulations, an air traffic control procedure, a North American Aerospace Defense Command Zone, or an Air Defense Identification Zone tolerance.

CBA Article 64, Section 4
JO 8020.16C
91 FAA Form 8020-26

Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP)

Voluntary Reporting:

What *can* you report?

Voluntary Safety Reporting

There are two kinds of ATSAP reports:

- Safety Events
- Safety Problems

What Can You Report?

Safety Events

Events are the result of an actual or potential loss of required separation, or other situations that degrade safety within the NAS, and occur during the provision of ATC services.

- When an individual is involved in, observes, or identifies an operational safety hazard/problem, or experiences a safety-related event.
- A single event can involve multiple individuals.
- Quality Assurance (QA) validates MORs and electronically reported encounters (PARs) for compliance/noncompliance. This determination is never made at the local level.

Note: PARs are not generated based on measurements of compliance. More on this tomorrow.

What Can You Report?

Safety Problems

Safety problems are issues at a local, regional, or national level. They are not normally related to individuals and may be determined to be systemic. They may include:

- Poor airport signage or markings
- Unsafe policies or procedures
- Equipment, software, or automation problems
- Unclear publications used to provide ATC services
- Traffic management initiatives that don't address sector needs
- Airspace configuration
- Human factors (fatigue, distractions)
- Staffing issues that impact the safety of the NAS
- Inadequate training practices

ATSAP: Our Responsibilities.

Everyone:

- •Protect confidentiality in all aspects
- •Protect program integrity
- •Facilities
- •Provide information to Event Review Committee (ERC) when requested
- •Provide information to ERC regarding potential Skill Enhancement Training (SET)
- •Feedback on SET effectiveness

ERC:

- •Communicate with Facility Management and Union
- •Work with the facility to provide effective SET, when needed
- •Identify systemic corrective actions



ATSAP: Best Practices for Interacting with ERC

Feedback on an event

- All relevant Information
- SET Recommendation
  - 7200.20A 3-1b (1) (c)Note: The ERC is interested in any additional information that facility management, union representative, and submitter can provide that would help the ERC understand not only what happened during a safety event, but also why the event happened. If SET is proposed, the information that forms the basis of the recommendation (for example, relevant portions of the employee's performance history, involvement in similar types of events, ongoing training, and other performance directly related to this type of event) must be supplied. A collaborative proposal from facility management and the union representative provides the most useable feedback for the ERC.
  - Article 95, Section 8. The Parties at the local level shall exchange Skill Enhancement Training (SET) recommendations made to the Event Review Committee (ERC) that were not jointly developed.

ATSAP: Best Practices for Interacting with ERC

Infoshares/AIRs/CISP Infoshares

- Article 64 Section 8. The Union, at the appropriate level, shall have the opportunity to provide a response to a request for information regarding a safety event or safety problem. The Agency will work with the Union in a predecisional, collaborative manner in developing a response to a Corrective Action Request (CAR). If the Parties cannot achieve a consensus on a resolution, they are free to pursue traditional processes for resolution.

ATSAP: Best Practices for Interacting with ERC

What happens when FacRep and ATM do not agree on a response to the ERC?

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)

What is ASRS? It is a program funded by the FAA and administered by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

Under the ASRS program, ATO employees may submit information that NASA will de-identify, except where it involves criminal activities or accidents, before submitting to the respective agencies participating in the program.

Reports and information are available at **http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/.**

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)

Protections: When an employee submits an ASRS report, disciplinary action may not be taken for a reported event if all of the following conditions are met:

- action was inadvertent;
- action did not involve a criminal offense,
- accident, or
- action under 49 United States Code, Section 44709, which discloses a lack of qualification or competency; and
- The employee shows proof that within 10 days after the occurrence, he/she completed and submitted
- When completing a VSRP report, employees may choose to electronically submit a copy of their VSRP report to ASRS via the VSRP database.

Rep's Role in Safety Reporting

- Promote ATSAP - Including education
- Support members during event reporting
- Review MORs
- Can you think of anything else?

MODULE 4

Partnership for Safety (PFS)

MODULE 4 OBJECTIVES

- Comprehend the purpose of PFS
- Describe the role of the LSC
- Understand the purpose of the monthly Safety Awareness for Excellence (SAFE) Discussions

Module 5 References:
- CBA Article 122
- JO 7200.21A

Partnership for Safety PFS

- **PFS Program**: Facilitate the identification and mitigation of safety issues at the local level through the support of collaborative Local Safety Councils (LSC).
- **Makeup**: LSCs are required at every FAA ATC facility. The LSC shall consist of one Union participant* and one Agency participant. Additional participants may be designated by mutual agreement. LSCs will meet once per month or as mutually determined by the parties at the local level.
- **Scoping Document**: Created and signed by sponsors (FacRep and ATM), establishing an LSC and defining its process.

*Any Bargaining Unit Employee that is a member of the LSC must be a NATCA member in good standing.

2016 CBA Article 122
JO 7200.21A

Partnership for Safety Tools

- **LSC Safety Data Portal**: Online database only accessible to LSC members. Contains safety trend and facility-specific information gathered through various sources. Information in the portal may not be used to attribute an occurrence to an employee, identify an individual employee, or for IPM purposes.
- **ATC infoHUB**: Online database only accessible to LSC members. Used for the storing and sharing of safety information, best practices, and lessons learned.

2016 CBA Article 122
JO 7200.21A

Partnership for Safety PFS

Safety Awareness for Excellence (SAFE) Discussion:

- ❖ Monthly **face-to-face** discussion facilitated by a member of the LSC (or other mutually agreed upon personnel)
- ❖ Must be attended by all operational personnel
- ❖ Includes National content provided by National PFS team in addition to local safety issues
- ❖ Assignment uploaded and tracked in CEDAR by National PFS team

*Note: CEDAR is intended to be used to track the completion of the SAFE discussions – it is **NOT** intended to replace the face-to-face discussions*

2016 CBA Article 122
JO 7200.21A



"ATSAP has received reports describing instances when a controller fails to respond to an automated alert function, such as a Conflict Alert, in the way that the function was intended. Conflict Alerts, and Mode C Intruder (MCI) alerts, are designed to alert radar controllers to existing or pending traffic situations that require immediate attention. Minimum Safe Altitude Warnings (MSAW) and En Route (E)-MSAW provide alerts when a tracked aircraft is below, or predicted by the computer to go below, a minimum safe altitude.

Reports describe occasions when a controller recognizes the alert but, for varying reasons, hesitates to respond, delays their reaction, or even ignores the alert. A few commonly described reasons for this include a desensitization to the alert due to a high frequency of alerts that require little or no action and incorrect assumptions about the conditions that may be provoking the alert."

Facility Discussion

- What are some best practices you can use to ensure that automated alerts always receive the most appropriate and expeditious response?
- What are some assumptions that may be made about the conditions causing an automated alert that could delay a controller's response to it?
- Share an experience when an automated alert may not have received the most appropriate or expeditious response.

*THESE SLIDES ARE NOT TO BE USED AS AN MBI. THIS APPLICABLE MATERIAL WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE REQUIRED JO 7200.21A) MONTHLY FACE TO FACE SAFE DISCUSSIONS.



Partnership for Safety PFS

LSC Barriers/Obstacles

Partnership for Safety PFS

Rep's Role in PFS

MODULE 5

Service Reviews & Corrective Action Plans (CAP)

MODULE 5 OBJECTIVES

- Define the purpose of a Quality Control (QC) Operational Skills Assessment (OSA)
- Define different types of service reviews and their uses
- Understand the representative's role in Service Reviews
- Understand the purpose of a Corrective Action Plan (CAP)
- Identify what triggers a CAP
- Identify the Union's role in the CAP process

Module 6 References:

- CBA
  - Article 51
  - Article 64
  - Article 122
- JO 7210.634A

Local QC Order Requirements

Facilities and/or districts must not create QC orders that either duplicate or contradict the national order or collective bargaining agreement.

Facility/district QC orders may only contain the following elements:

- QC OSA sampling plan
- Plan for conducting random/scheduled System Service Reviews (SSRs) (and Traffic Management Reviews (TMRs) for facilities with Traffic Management Units)
- Designation of points of contact for Systemic Issue Reviews (SYSIRs)
- QC OSA Validation sampling plan to be documented in the CEDAR.
- Certification and Performance Skill Check Validation process to be documented in CEDAR
- OJT Documentation Validation process to be documented in CEDAR
- Requirements for recurring reports on performed QC processes, results of analyses of safety data, implemented corrective action plans, and data monitoring activities.

JO 7210.634A Ch. 2-2

Background Information

QC OSA

Quality Control is separate from performance management activities. QC OSAs are a means to collect data and measure organizational performance.

A QC OSA must not be used as the basis of, or to support individual performance management (IPM). Employee's identifiable information will not be associated with the OSA.

Potential systemic non-compliant/risk identified in QC OSAs must be analyzed through the service review or the compliance verification processes in order to validate and understand the potential issue.

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IPM OSA

IPM is separate and distinct from the QC process. An IPM OSA is a supplemental tool for IPM to address an on-going performance deficiency.

IPM OSAs are not to be conducted unless an ongoing performance deficiency has been identified and documented.

May be conducted through direct or remote monitoring, live observation, or playback tools

Where such capabilities exist, a replay and/or voice recording of the session must be included in any discussion about the OSA.

Conducted by employee's direct supervisor

JO 7210.634A Ch. 3-2
JO 3400.20 Paragraph 5a(2)

Service Reviews

Service Reviews provide a methodical manner to take a broad look at all facets that affect the delivery of air traffic services.

JO 7210.634A

Service Reviews

Intent of an SSR: Review the air traffic services provided in any situation at any time under any circumstances.

Who may request an SSR? Personnel performing watch supervision (OS, OM, CIC, etc.).

Who may conduct an SSR? Facility staff managers and FacReps (or designees of each). **They shall be conducted collaboratively and findings should be jointly developed.**

When should SSRs be conducted? Randomly, scheduled, due to public inquiries, or post-event. Services Rendered Telephone Conferences (SRT) that result in "Yellow" or "Red" color-codes require an SSR.

JO 7210.634A; CBA Art. 64, Sec. 7

Service Reviews

Intent of a TMR: Perform an evaluation of traffic management operations with a focus on identifying issues that may impact system efficiency.

Who may initiate a TMR? ATCSCC, Vice President, Director of Operations, QCG, District General Manager, Supervisory Traffic Management Coordinator (STMC), Traffic Management Coordinator-in-Charge, OS, OM, CIC, etc.

Who may perform a TMR? SDP-designated staff and FacReps (or designees of each) at SDPs and with a TMU or at the ATCSCC. **They shall be conducted collaboratively and findings should be jointly developed.**

When should TMRs be conducted? Randomly, scheduled, or post-event.

JO 7210.634A; CBA Art. 64, Sec. 7

Service Reviews

Intent of a CER: Supplement and document the existing required review of air traffic services rendered during an aircraft accident.

When to initiate a CER? After any aircraft accident involving fatalities in which air traffic services were provided. The Director/Deputy Director of Operations, Senior Advisor, or the QCG on behalf of the Director of Operations in each respective service area makes this determination.

Who may conduct a CER? SDP managers and FacReps (or designees of each). They shall be conducted collaboratively and findings should be jointly developed.

JO 7210.634A; CBA Art. 64, Sec. 7

Intent of a SYSIR: Identify areas that have potential system impact, whether at facility, service area, or national level.

When to conduct a SYSIR? When a suspected systemic issue is found during OSAs, SSRs, CER, or CSBR processes. Or when systemic issues are otherwise suspected.

Who may conduct a SYSIR? Each SDP must identify designees for the systemic areas of training, efficiency, airspace/airport, procedures, directives, and technical operations. These designees shall collaborate with FacReps (or their designees) and findings should be jointly developed.

JO 7210.634A; CBA Art. 64, Sec. 7

How do you conduct a Service Review?

- A service review is a tool to be utilized in a proactive manner and is intended to be used to identify areas of improvement, and areas of system risk from the Service Delivery Point (SDP).
- It is used to perform a collaborative, in-depth analysis for identifying and/or validating a facility's compliance and/or non-compliance status on a particular issue.
- A written report of the results is generated. However, all interviewed participants will remain anonymous and all names will be sterilized from the report, except in a CER.

JO 7210.634A

Creating a Service Review in CEDAR

- Complete the Question Tree in CEDAR— Observations are entered in the tree comments section.
- Review Team
  - Establishes what happened, why, and how. Mitigation recommendations may also be established by the team.
- Attach Supporting Documentation
  - Replays with audio, audio files, documents, and other pertinent information.
  - Data will provide a more complete picture of the operation as it relates to the report.
- Finalize in CEDAR (and if needed, create a CAP)
- Send findings memorandum to the ATM

What is NATCA's Role in Service Reviews?

Collaboration

Verifications and Validations

ARTICLE 64

SAFETY EVENTS REPORTING AND REVIEW

Section 9. The principles and processes contained within Article 51 of this Agreement shall be utilized for a Compliance Verification (CV), ~~Quality Control Check (QCC)~~ or Quality Control Validation (QCV), regardless of the level at which the activity is conducted.

ARTICLE 51

FACILITY EVALUATIONS, AUDITS, AND ASSESSMENTS

Section 1. When an evaluation, audit or assessment is conducted at an air traffic facility, the Union at the local level may designate one (1) member to serve on the evaluation team. The designee shall function at the direction of the evaluation team leader as a full member of the evaluation team. The designee's schedule shall be adjusted so he/she may participate in a duty status.

CBA Art. 64, Sec. 9; CBA Art. 51, Sec 1.

Collaboration

Verifications

Compliance Verifications (CV). CVs are a way to assess SDP (Service Delivery Point) performance and identify areas for improvement.

- **Internal Compliance Verification (ICV)**. Planned assessments accomplished using a checklist and random sampling methods such as, but not limited to, direct observations, discussions with SDP personnel, review of data, equipment parameters, certification parameters, and examination of other documentation. All FAA air traffic control SDPs and federal contract towers must conduct an ICV annually each fiscal year
- **External Compliance Verification (ECV)**. Assessments of SDPs conducted as-needed as determined by the service unit, director of operations at the service area, and/or the QCG, with the concurrence of the director of operations. Determinations to conduct ECVs will be based on data analysis that identifies potential risk within specific SDPs. ECVs may be conducted through various methods that may include developing a custom checklist and a review of available data, direct observation, interviews with personal and other appropriate means.

JO 7210.634A

ICV / ECV Findings

Exemplary (E): This finding is assigned to items that demonstrate exemplary performance in quality and efficiency.

Compliant (C): This finding is assigned to items that are completed in compliance with national, service area, and local requirements. Details are not required to be entered into the CVT.

Non-compliant Low Risk (NL): This finding is assigned to items that are non- compliant, but do not represent a moderate or significant safety risk to the National Airspace System (NAS).

Non-compliant Medium Risk (NM): This finding is assigned to items that are non- compliant and represent a moderate safety risk to the NAS.

Non-compliant High Risk (NH): This finding is assigned to items that are non- compliant and represent a significant safety risk to the NAS.

Not Observed (NO): This item is assigned to items that are not observed during the verification. The reason the item was not observed must be documented.

Validations

Quality Control Validations (QCV): The QCV process check is a statistical sampling of a particular process or task to ensure compliance and accuracy. This process may also identify potential systemic issues associated with training efficiency, airspace, procedures, directives, and equipment.

OSA validations

Certification and Performance skill check validations

On-the-job training documentation (OJTD) validations

Collaboration

Validating a Systemic Issue:

Service Review	Compliance Verification
SSR	Internal
TMR	External
CER	
SYSIR	

JO 7210.634A

Verification and Validation Recap

What is NATCA's Role in Verifications and Validations?

What is a Corrective Action Plan (CAP)?

Process used as a method of correcting **validated** safety issues and a means for measuring the completion and effectiveness of identified mitigations.

CAPs may be generated from the following:

- Service Reviews
- Compliance Verifications
- QC Validations
- Significant events (require an SSR to validate)
- LSC analysis (validation of issues through SSRs is encouraged)
- Runway Safety Action Teams (RSATs)
- For issues identified externally such as AOV audits, NTSB investigations, and/or AJI audits.

CAP Collaboration

Section 4. Non-ATSAP Terminal/En Route Facility CAP Process: The Agency will collaborate with the Facility Representative, or his/her designee, in the development and implementation of CAPs, as well as the review of the effectiveness of mitigations prior to the closure of a CAP at a terminal/en route facility.

Section 5. The Agency will collaborate with the Union at the appropriate level if there is a need to amend a CAP developed at the local level.

Section 6. If the Parties cannot achieve consensus during any phase of the CAR/CAP process, they shall follow the provisions identified in Section 7 of Article 114 of this Agreement.

CAP Development: Gathering Input

CAP development teams should ensure that they gather input from relevant facility personnel to ensure all information is considered in creating a CAP.

Facility personnel could include the following depending on the specific issue:

- Facility staff personnel (e.g., Quality Control, airspace/procedures, training)
- Operational staff (e.g., controllers, supervisors, operations managers)
- Facility management (e.g., support managers, facility manager, staff manager)

How to create a CAP

The following steps are required to complete a CAP:

- Describe the specific corrective actions that will mitigate the facility non-compliance/risk
- Examples of corrective actions include, but are not limited to:
  - Training (must target the specific knowledge gap)
  - Changes to local procedures and/or processes
  - Realignment of airspace
  - Changes to letters of agreement with adjacent facilities, airport operators, etc.
  - Identify the scope of the correction (e.g., facility-wide, area-wide, etc.)
- Identify a timeframe for completion of the action(s) taken
- Identify a monitoring plan for determining effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions
- Identify the target for mitigation effectiveness

How to create a CAP

Critical Points

- CAPs must be developed for all validated systemic facility non-compliance/risk.
- CAPs must be documented primarily in CEDAR (and the CVT or ATC InfoHub when applicable/required).
- CAPs must address five critical elements:
  - Identify specific mitigations to correct the systemic non-compliance.
  - Define the intended scope of the CAP.
  - Define a timeframe for completion of the CAP.
  - Define a monitoring plan, including what data will be used, a timeframe, and who is responsible for accomplishing monitoring.
  - Define mitigation effectiveness, including how the facility will determine the CAP was effective using the collected data.
- If the CAP does not effectively mitigate the validated systemic non-compliance, a revised CAP must be developed, documented, and implemented.

Subject of CAP

Safety Monitoring Watchlist

Risk or Hazard

Detailed Description of Validated Safety Issue(s)



CAP Form

Add Regulation

Mitigation Plan

Monitoring Plan Details

Effectiveness Target



CAP Form

Add Attachments

Forward with Comments

Save Draft, Send for Approval, or Cancel



What is NATCA's Role in CAPs?

MODULE 6

Occurrence/Encounter Follow-On Activities

MODULE 6 OBJECTIVES

- Understand the purpose of a Services Rendered Telephone Conference (SRT) and your role as a participant
- Recognize what to do when you don't agree with something said during SRT
- ARIA processes

Module 7 References:
- CBA
  - Article 51
  - Article 64
  - Article 122
- ARIA MOU
- SRT MOU
- JO 7210.634A
- JO 1030.3B

A **management** telephone conference conducted with the ATO Safety and Technical Training Compliance Services Group (CSG), the Service Area Director(s) of Operations, Mission Support Staff, Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention, Operations Control Center, the involved facility, and others as needed, **to review and assess the ATO services associated with a significant or noteworthy event**.

JO 1030.3B

Services Rendered Telcon SRT

- If there is a difference of opinion, those topics will be discussed outside of the SRT in a collaborative manner.
- National Safety Rep. (NSR) and FacRep shall be invited and afforded the opportunity to participate.
- FacRep shall also be given the opportunity to participate in associated activities (e.g.: review ATC communications, display/radar playback).
- The Agency will not delay an SRT if the NSR or FacRep are unable to participate.

SRT MOU

SRT Notification Example

A Services Rendered TELCON will be conducted at 2/29/2025 4:00 PM for the event described below.

Event Summary:

Salt Lake ARTCC (ZLC) / Los Angeles ARTCC (ZLA) – Sunday, Feb. 29, 2025, at 6:43 p.m. MDT: (AirSmart) XSM26/PC12 flew for approximately 88 miles on a limited data block at FL220 and entered ZLA Sector 7 airspace without coordination. XSM26's flight plan was inadvertently removed by the ZLC Sector 44 Radar (R44) controller. The ZLA Sector 7 Radar (R7) controller observed the limited data block 11 miles inside their airspace, coordinated with the R44 controller to establish communication with XSM26, and re-acquired their full data block. ZLC and ZLA reported XSM26 did not conflict with other aircraft.

SRT Results Example

Salt Lake ARTCC (ZLC) / Los Angeles ARTCC (ZLA) – Sunday, March 9, 2025, at 6:43 p.m. MDT

(AirSmart) XSM26/PC12 flew for approximately 88 miles on a limited data block at FL220 and entered ZLA Sector 7 Radar (R7) airspace without coordination. XSM26's flight plan was inadvertently removed by the ZLC Sector 44 Radar (R44) controller. The ZLA R7 controller observed the limited data block 11 miles inside their airspace, coordinated with the ZLC R44 controller to establish communication with XSM26, and re-acquired their full data block. ZLC and ZLA reported XSM26 did not conflict with any aircraft.



An SRT was conducted, and the event was color-coded "Yellow" for ZLC with QCG follow-up required, and "Green" for ZLA with no follow-up required. These were the main findings of the SRT:

- The ZLC ATM described the traffic volume as moderate with moderate complexity. The weather was VFR.
- The ZLA ATM described the traffic volume as moderate with routine complexity. The weather was VFR.
- ZLC Area C: There were nine CPCs, two trainees, and one OS on duty. Five positions were open. Four CPCs and one OS were on position. Four CPCs and two trainees were available, with one CPC on other duties. The OS was providing direct supervision.
- ZLA Area F: There were 14 CPCs, six trainees, and two OSs on duty. Seven positions were open. Seven CPCs, three trainees, and one OS were on position. Five CPCs and three trainees were available, with two CPCs and one OS on other duties. A CIC was providing direct supervision.
- The ZLC ATM briefed the ZLC R44 controller received a VFR flight-following cancellation from an uninvolved aircraft, which was in the vicinity of XSM26; however, they removed the flight plan on XSM26.
- XSM26 exited the R44 sector while on a limited data block and entered the ZLA R7 sector without a transfer of radar identification or communication.
- The ZLC ATM briefed the R44 position, a low-altitude sector, was combined with the Sector 33 Radar position, a high-altitude sector. A Radar Associate position was not staffed for the R44 position during the event.

Event Response Team ERT

Event Response Team (ERT): A diverse group of subject matter experts led by the Event Investigation Manager (EIM), responsible for reviewing events and performing other duties as set forth in JO 1030.3B.

JO 1030.3B

Event Response Team ERT

SRT Color Code Determination. After a review of the services provided the CSG Manager or designee, using sound judgment and expertise, will determine a color code designation.

Red Events: The CSG Manager or designee should classify events as red when they believe that an ERT should be launched immediately to conduct an on-site review of air traffic services.

Red events might include, but are not limited to:

(1) Significant or noteworthy accident involving an air carrier, air taxi, or general aviation aircraft

(2) Events with significant/noteworthy regional or national media or political interest (3) Natural disasters affecting air traffic services

(4) Near Mid Air Collision reports

Yellow Events: The CSG Manager or designee should classify events as yellow when more information is needed to determine whether an on-site event review of air traffic services is required or when the on-site event review does not need to occur immediately.

Green Events: The CSG Manager or designee should classify events as green when no headquarters response appears to be required or headquarters may be able to monitor/review the post-event process without launching an ERT.

JO 1030.3B

Event Response Team ERT

An ERT must be launched immediately to conduct an on-site investigation for all **red events**. For events color-coded **yellow**, the CSG Manager or designee in consultation with the Director of Operations, Service Unit, and Director of Safety may, when necessary, determine the need to launch an ERT. Whenever possible, this determination will either be made during the SRT or no later than 4 hours following conclusion of the SRT. An ERT need not be launched for any events color-coded **green**.

The Vice President for Safety and Technical Training may initiate an ERT review for any event or to address safety concerns. Additionally, if the NTSB determines it will launch an ATC Workgroup, an Event Investigation Manager (EIM) will be assigned and an ERT will be launched.

JO 1030.3B

Risk-Based Safety Management (RBSM)

vs.

Compliance-Based Safety Management

Risk-Based Safety Management



Risk-Based Safety Management

JO 7210.634A

Service Area Safety Representatives

- Western Service Area:
  - Samantha Navarro: **snavarro@natca.net**
- Central Service Area:
  - Nathan Vinson: **nvinson@natca.net**
- Eastern Service Area
  - Sandii Follmer: **sfollmer@natca.net**

Rep's Role in Follow-On Activities

- Services Rendered Telcon (SRT)
- Barrier Analysis Review Outcome Discussion

MODULE 7

Accident/Incident Response

MODULE 7 OBJECTIVES

- Understand responsibilities for accident notification
- Understand representational role

Module 8 References:

- CBA
  - Article 64
  - Article 119
- JO 7210.634A
- JO 1030.3B
- ASI Accident Checklist

Position Relief	Representation	Notification
Bargaining Unit Employees (BUEs) last providing services to an aircraft that results in a fatal accident shall be relieved from position as soon as operationally possible in accordance with Article 64, Section 2 of the CBA. In accordance with FAA Order JO 1030.3B 4.1, for every fatal accident where ATC services were provided, a Covered Event Review (CER) must be conducted in accordance with FAA Order JO 7210.634, within three (3) administrative days. The employee(s) last providing ATC services must remain relieved from operation/control positions until the CER and any CER-associated training, if assigned, is completed.	Provide representation to all involved BUEs. As soon as practicable, move each BUE to a private area where he or she can process the event and speak with a NATCA representative	As soon as possible, call your Regional Vice President (RVP) and Regional NATCA Accident/Incident point of contact. Be prepared to provide the following: • Your name, facility, and NATCA position (FacRep, Local Officer, Member) • A list of phone numbers where you can be contacted; and • A description of the accident/incident and an initial assessment of any potential ATC concerns

Media Issues	Personnel Statements	CISD/CISM
Do NOT interact with the media under any circumstances and advise BUEs NOT to post or comment about the accident/incident on social media. Direct all media requests to NATCA's Deputy Director of Public Affairs. Unauthorized statements in the media and/or on social media could result in disciplinary action and may affect NATCA's participation as a party to any NTSB investigation.	Signed personnel statements are only required in the event of a pilot deviation pursuant to Article 64, section 4. If management requests a signed personnel statement as a result of the accident/incident, contact your RVP as soon as possible. If management orders a BUE to provide a signed personnel statement in an instance other than a pilot deviation, he or she should comply with the order, and contact his or her RVP. Prior to provide a signed personnel statement, listen to voice tapes of each pertinent control position with each BUE and review video replay, if applicable. BUEs should provide only a brief outline of the pertinent facts (e.g., name, position, basic events) and include the following statement: "The above statement is true and factual to the best of my knowledge, based upon the information available to me at this time."	Encourage BUEs to engage in Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) and refer them to the NATCA Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) team, as established in Article 74. The NATCA CISM team provides confidential, nonjudgmental, peer-to-peer support in the wake of stressful events to promote recovery following a difficult experience (for more information contact the NATCA CISM team). BUEs do not have to have been directly involved in the accident/incident to contact CISM. All contact with the CISM team is confidential.

Injury Compensation Forms	ATSAP	NASA ASRS
BUEs who believe they have suffered a traumatic emotional injury as a result of an accident/incident may file an injury compensation form with the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWCP). Copies of OWCP Form CA-1 will be available at every facility and are used to document when an injury has occurred. Contact your RVP and the NATCA OWCP Representative if you have questions about filing out the form.	All BUEs involved in an accident/incident should file an ATSAP report. It is important that all statements within an ATSAP report are as accurate as possible and are consistent with the BUE's other interviews and comments. Be aware that reports related to an accident/incident may be ordered to be released during litigation.	NATCA **does not** recommend that controllers file a NASA ASRS report in the event of an accident. NASA cannot accept accident reports and is required to send the ASRS report to the NTSB with submitter contact information.

Release from Facility	Drug/Alcohol Testing	Stay Calm
If a BUE is unable to safely perform his or her duties because of his or her emotional state, you should request that management release the involved BUE from the facility as soon as practicable. If the requested release is denied, the BUE is entitled to use leave on the basis that he or she is "incapacitated for duty." Contact your RVP immediately if the release request is denied. Work with local management to determine when the BUE is expected to return for duty and make sure that the BUE can be contacted.	A BUE's release from the facility may be delayed pending a decision by the FAA on whether to test the involved BUE for drugs and/or alcohol. Post accident/incident testing is a mandatory condition of employment and BUEs must comply. Post accident/incident test should be conducted in accordance with Article 73, section 14 of the CBA. It may take several hours to receive the decision to test. For issues related to drug/alcohol testing, contact your RVP. BUEs are entitled to representation during the testing process but must request such representation, so be sure to advise them to make the request. If Union representation is not readily available, the employee should request to confer with a Union rep via telephone. NOTE: NTSB investigators sometimes ask BUEs to take a separate drug test. However, unlike FAA testing, NTSB testing is not mandatory, and BUEs should decline this	Do your best to stay focused and represent your BUEs to the best of your ability, and remember your rights in the CBA. Try to be reasonable with management's requests but stay in regular contact with you RVP. . BUEs should always comply with direct orders from management, but be sure to carefully document any issues and relay those to your RVP. If you are unsure about something, call your RVP for assistance.

Visit:
https://www.natca.org/ASI

Accident/Incident Response

Rep's Role in an Accident/Incident

MODULE 8

Safety Management System (SMS)

MODULE 8 OBJECTIVES

- Understand the purpose of SMS
- Identify when an SRM panel is required
- Identify everyone involved in an SRM panel and their role

Module 9 References:

- CBA Article 123
- FAA Order 8000.369
- SMS Manual

When SRM must be conducted:

The SRM process is used to assess the safety risk of NAS changes or existing safety issues associated with the provision of air traffic management services.
For the ATO, a NAS change is a modification to any element of the NAS that pertains to or could affect the provision of air traffic management and communication, navigation, and surveillance services. Air traffic controllers and technicians, their training, and their certification are elements of the NAS and directly relate to the provision of air traffic services.

2016 CBA Article 123
FAA Order 8000.369
SMS Manual

- The ATO SMS focuses on the safe provision of air traffic control and navigation services. Accordingly, it does not directly apply to issues related to the environment, occupational safety and health, physical security, cybersecurity, or information security, unless those issues affect the operational safety of NAS services provided by the ATO.

Components of SMS

- Safety Policy
- Safety Promotion
- Safety Assurance
- Safety Risk Management (SRM)



Safety Policy

Safety Policy

- The documented organizational policy that defines management's commitment, responsibility, and accountability for safety. Safety Policy identifies and assigns responsibilities to key safety personnel.
- Includes:
  - CBA Article 123
  - SMS Orders
  - SMS Manual
  - Safety Guidance
  - FAA/ATO Safety Orders
  - Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions (SRMGSA)

ATO SMS Safety Policy is derived from other SMS Processes



Safety Promotion

Safety Promotion

- The communication and distribution of information to improve the safety culture and the development and implementation of programs and/or processes that support the integration and continuous improvement of the SMS within the ATO. Safety Promotion allows the ATO to share and provide evidence of successes and lessons learned.
- Includes
  - SMS Training
  - Lessons Learned
  - Workshops
  - Safety Communication

Safety Promotion includes safety programs and initiatives

- Recurrent Training
- Top 5
- Fatigue Risk Management
- Partnership for Safety
- Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs
  - ATSAP
  - ATSAP-X
  - T-SAP
  - CISP
- Lessons Learned

Safety Assurance

Safety Assurance

- A set of processes within the SMS that verify that the organization meets or exceeds its safety performance objectives and that function systematically to determine the effectiveness of safety risk controls through the collection, analysis, and assessment of information.
- Includes
  - Identifying Hazards
  - VSRP Data
  - Safety Risk Monitoring
  - PFS
  - Investigations
  - Data Analysis
  - Audits and Evaluations

Safety Assurance works in concert with SRM to monitor and mitigate NAS risk



Safety Risk Management

Safety Risk Management

- The processes and procedures established and used by ATO safety practitioners to identify hazards, analyze and assess the associated risks, implement safety risk mitigations, and, as applicable, define safety performance targets.
- Simply put: **SRM determines the need for and adequacy of risk controls.**

Safety Risk Management

When must SRM be conducted?

- Safety analyses are most frequently performed in response to a NAS change.
- For the ATO, a NAS change is a modification to ANY element of the NAS that pertains to or could affect the provision of air traffic management and communication, navigation, and surveillance services. Air traffic controllers and technicians, their training, and their certification are elements of the NAS and directly to the provision of air traffic services.

CBA requirements (Article 123)

NATCA must be invited if BUEs are affected.	The agency should provide notice 30 days prior.	NATCA is responsible for all costs. The agency will reimburse mileage when a GOV is not available.
NATCA reps will be in duty status, including travel time.	A briefing package will be provided in advance. Duty time to review the package will be afforded.	If NATCA does not concur with the panel, the Union may submit written comments to the Agency for consideration.

What to expect if you are selected for a Panel.

TRAINING: Training will be provided to first time SRM panel members prior to the start of the Panel.

ROLES: Members of SRM panels have specific titles and roles

- Change Proponent: The party that is proposing a NAS change or address an existing safety issue.
- Facilitator: A trained expert on the SRM process who moderates the deliberations of the Panel from a neutral position.
- Panel Member: Voting member who performs the safety assessment.
- Subject Matter Expert: A technical expert.
- Panel Observer: An individual present during the proceedings.

Safety Risk Management

What to expect if you are selected for a Panel.

- REVIEW CURRENT SYSTEM
- REVIEW PROPOSED CHANGE OR EXISTING ISSUE
- DEVELOP PRELIMINARY HAZARD LIST (if no hazards are identified, go to last step)
- DEVELOP HAZARD ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
- DEVELOP MONITORING PLAN
- SRM DOCUMENTATION

Safety Risk Management

Let's try one....

Current System

A victor route is established between two VORs in separate facilities within mountainous terrain. Radar coverage is not always reliable at low altitudes.

Proposed Changes

Creation of two waypoints along the victor route, each 5 miles from the common boundary. They can be used as transfer of control points, as necessary. The proposed waypoint names are LAZER and LAYSE.

WHAT RISKS CAN YOU IDENTIFY?

Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to people; damage to or loss of a system, equipment, or property; or damage to the environment. A hazard is a prerequisite to an accident or incident.



Let's try one....



Safety Risk Management

Let's try one....

<u>If we do not find any hazards....</u>

The panel will prepare the SRM Documentation stating so.

RISKS IDENTIFIED

Once we create our Preliminary Hazards List (PHL), the Panel will go through Hazard Assessment Worksheet (HAW).

HAW ICE EXAMPLE: IDENTIFY HAZARDS

Identify the Hazards

(1) Hazard ID	(2) Hazard Description	(3) Causes	(4) System State
ABC-01	FIX Confusion	Creating a new fix with similar name	Everyday

What the HAW accomplishes.

- **Controls:** Understand the impact of the control
- Must be associated with the change, hazard, cause and system state
- Cite the specific version, paragraph and/or section number(s) when using FAA Orders
- Include information explaining how the control mitigates the risk

Safety Risk Management

What the HAW accomplishes.

Risk levels are assessed for each hazard based on severity and likelihood:

Severity / Likelihood	Minimal 5	Minor 4	Major 3	Hazardous 2	Catastrophic 1
Frequent A	Low	Medium	High	High	High
Probable B	Low	Medium	High	High	High
Remote C	Low	Medium	Medium	High	High
Extremely Remote D	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	High
Extremely Improbable E	Low	Low	Low	Medium	High* / Medium

*Risk is high when there is a single-point or common cause failure.

Safety Risk Management

Assess RISK

LOW: Acceptable

- May be implemented (but safety requirements are recommended)
- Must have at least one safety performance target
- Measurable goals used to verify the predicted residual risk of a hazard

MEDIUM: Acceptable

- May be implemented but safety requirements are recommended to increase the safety margin

HIGH: Unacceptable risk

- Must be mitigated to a Medium or Low risk prior to implementation

Treat the RISK

- Risk Control
- Risk Avoid
- Risk Transfer
- Risk Assumption

How do you request an SRM?

Support

Contact your Regional Safety Representative when an SRM Panel is being convened at your facility. Regional Safety Reps have received SMS training and are available to assist with the preparation for SRM Panels.

These reps coordinate with the National Office, Safety & Technology Department, and National SMS representative to ensure NATCA's position on Safety issues is consistent across the NAS.

Support

NAL: Jennifer Bradshaw, jbradshaw@natca.org

NCE: Travis Arnold, tarnold@natca.net

NEA: Anthony Hughes, anthonyhughes28@yahoo.com

NGL: Jon Kunowski, jkunowski@natca.net

Mike Taylor, mtaylor@natca.net

NNE: Seth Myers, smyers@natca.net

NNM: Randall Parkman, rparkman@natca.org

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Safety Management System **SMS**

Rep's Role in SMS

MODULE 9

Local Runway Safety Action Team (LRSAT) Meetings

MODULE 9 OBJECTIVES

- Understand the purpose of an LRSAT
- Identify the frequency of an LRSAT
- Understand representational role

Module 10 References:

- CBA Article 113
- FAA JO 7050.1B

Identify and Reduce the Risk of Runway Incursions and Excursions

- LRSATs also create an environment where our team can acknowledge that there is room for improvement, by encouraging everyone to freely discuss issues and concerns in order to develop best practices and mitigations
- LRSAT's meetings are **required ONCE per fiscal year**. It is **recommended** to have **QUARTERLY RSAT meetings** as open communication between all parties tends to lead towards safer results.
- It is encouraged to be an active participant in these meetings as you are an integral part of the team.

LRSAT Participants

- Airport Operator
- Air Traffic Control Manager
- NATCA Representative (Designee)
- Office of Airports
- Terminal Operations
- Regional Runway Safety Team
- Local Stakeholders (Invite flight schools, tenants, airlines (management and union), fire and rescue, etc.

LRSAT Data Review

- Runway Incursions/Safety Incidents
- Safety Concerns
- Identified Hazards
- Airport Construction
- Runway Safety Areas
- Hot Spots
- These meetings allow for an open discussion thru all of these topics, develop mitigations, action items and more.
- When we contribute and participate with these meetings the better we build upon the relationships on the airfield, and create mitigations that actually work

LRSAT Process

- The LRSAT will go over some national statistics, but will not go into this much detail
- Your LRSAT will follow the national statistics with your local statistics
- This statistic portion is a good opportunity for you to get involved.
  - Ask your ATM if you can brief the statistics and local runway incursions
  - This is a good opportunity for the audience to get involved as there will most likely be questions
  - Keep this very professional and just brief the facts

LRSAT Process

Local Runway Safety Action Team (LRSAT) Meeting Agenda (Example)

Local Runway Safety Action Team (LRSAT) Meeting Agenda
Welcome to the team - Introduction of team members
- FAA Air Traffic Manager
- NATCA FacRep
- Airport Manager
- Stakeholders - Self Introductions (please sign roster)

Runway Safety briefing
- RSAT Process
- Definitions and statistics
- Local Runway Incursions
- Hot topics in runway safety
- Develop Action Items

Open discussion
- Stakeholder / user perspective
- Identify risk factors or current initiatives

Develop Runway Safety Action Plan (RSAP) / Develop action items
Adjournment

LRSAT Participation

- The Parties agree that prevention of runway incursions is a top priority and acknowledge the value of runway safety initiatives in addressing runway safety problems/issues
- The FacRep (Designee) shall be afforded the opportunity to Participate in All Local Runway Safety Meetings
- The Agency shall notify the facility at least thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled runway safety meeting(s) unless an exigency exists
- The Surface Incident Prevention Plan (SIPP), also known as the Runway Safety Action Plan (RSAP) shall be provided to National Runway Safety Representative and the FacRep concurrently with its submission to the Facility Manager. For more information on Corrective Action Plans refer to Article 112 of the NATCA/FAA 2016 CBA

LRSAT Outcome

Runway Safety Action Plans:

- Has your discussions today prompted any thoughts as to what can be done differently at your airport to improve surface safety?
- Capture those initiatives in your annual Runway Safety Action Plan (RSAP).

Note: RSAP's are about 7 pages (includes: Airport Stats, Incident History, RSAT Meeting Overview, Review of Previous Action Items, New Action Items, Best Practices)

- When developing Action Items, please remember that they are non-regulatory, voluntary and flexible.
- The party responsible for implementing and/or funding the action item must be in agreement.
- Each action item should be specific and include a point of contact and anticipated completion date.

Rep's Role in an LRSAT Meeting

LRSAT Contact

Contact your National Runway Safety Representative at:
runwaysafety@natca.net

Any safety-related questions can be sent to QAQC@natca.net. This email address is monitored by NATCA's National Safety Committee.